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PANEL DISCUSSION: THE FUTURE OF AIRLINE TRAVEL
PANEL OF SPEAKERS
John Attanasio (Symposium Moderator)






G OOD AFTERNOON. I would like to welcome all of you to
this final session in our conference on airline security. As
many of you know, this is the first in a series of three confer-
ences that the Dedman School of Law will be sponsoring on the
events of September 11 th. The next one will be in February and
will be on terrorism's burdens on globalization.
This conference is being organized by The Journal of Air Law
and Commerce. I would like to thank the officers of The Journa4
and in particular Evan Singer, the editor in chief, and also Alisa
Sheldon, the managing editor, and all those associated with The
Journal for a remarkable job, particularly, as it was organized
under intense time pressure. I would also like to thank Al Casey
and John Nance who played instrumental roles in organizing
this, again on very, very short notice. Actually, I think we should
give them all a round of applause.
I will briefly introduce our distinguished panel today in the
order in which they're going to be speaking. Dr. Michael Cox is
senior vice president and chief economist of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Dallas. He is president of the Association of Private En-
terprise Education, and adjunct scholar at The Cato Institute.
He is senior fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis and
author of Myths of Rich and Poor, which was nominated for a Pul-
itzer Prize. He's also served as an adjunct professor in our eco-
nomics department for a number of years.
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Dr. Albert Casey is the former chairman and CEO of AMR
Corporation/American Airlines, Inc. and is the distinguished
executive in residence in the Department of Management and
Organization in SMU's Edwin L. Cox School of Business. He is
the former Postmaster General of the United States and is the
former chairman and CEO of First Republic Bank Corporation,
and president and CEO - former president and CEO of The
Times Mirror Company. Did you really do all that?
Unidentified Speaker
He really did. He really did.
John Attanasio
Did you write this?
Unidentified Speaker
I hope so. His mother did.
John Attanasio
Next, we'll have James Hall. Mr. Hall is former chairman of
the National Transportation Safety Board. He has also served as
chairman on the Board of Inquiry for Public Hearings on many
major transportation accidents including the US Air Flight 427
and TWA Flight 800. He is a former member of the White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and has
served as counsel to the United States Senate Subcommittee on
Intergovernmental Relations.
Our final panelist is E. Ray Hutchinson, who is a partner at
the law firm of Vinson & Elkins and specializes in the field of
public law and finance. He is a distinguished graduate of this
law school, I'm proud to say, and two years ago, won the Galvin
Award for service to the school, one of the two highest awards
that the school can bestow on alumni. He is a former member
of the Texas House of Representatives and a former chairman
of the Republican Party of Texas. He is a member of the execu-
tive committee of the Republican National Committee of the
United States and chairman of the charter review committee of
the City of Dallas. He has represented Dallas/Fort Worth Inter-
national Airport since its inception. And you might be inter-
ested to know there's a little bit of other history regarding the
law school, that this building, which is named after Mr. George
Underwood, George Underwood chaired a lot of that effort. He
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said, "Who are we getting to talk about airports?" And I said,
"Ray Hutchinson." He said, "Well, he's the best there is."
Finally, to moderate today's panel, we have Mr. John Nance.
Mr. Nance is also a distinguished graduate of the SMU Law
School. He is a native Texan who grew up in Dallas, received his
Bachelors degree from SMU, and hisJD from this place. He is a
licensed attorney and a decorated Air Force pilot veteran of Vi-
etnam and Operations Desert Storm and Desert Shield. Mr.
Nance is an internationally recognized air safety analyst and ad-
vocate best known to North American audiences as aviation ana-
lyst for ABC television network, and is the aviation editor for
Good Morning America. He has authored twelve major fiction and
non-fiction books. He has piloted many aircraft and logged over
13,000 hours of flight time in his commercial airline and Air
Force careers. In fact, he continues to serve as a Boeing 737
captain for a major airline and flies his own aircraft.
Mr. Nance will be the moderator of our panel. And so it gives
me great pleasure to introduce Mr. John Nance.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
It's always wonderful to be back in my law school here. And
Dean, this time I have read the case. I still have nightmares
about being unprepared in my law school.
When we talk about the airline industry, we are talking about
not just airline companies. We're also talking about a huge in-
frastructure, an infrastructure which includes the airports that
have to expand and contract and maintain the capability to be
the end receiver of all the passengers in the place it begins. It
also includes government, and it includes a society.
Let me go back briefly here before we get started. Just a little
bit of a history I think is in order. The contemporary develop-
ment of the airline industry is something that we don't often
talk about. In the '50s, the airline industry of the United States
was pure transportation. It was a little bit unavailable to the ma-
jority of people. In the '60s, it was not just transportation, but
with the advent of the jet age, it became part of the American
dream. The term 'jet set," for instance, the idea that you could
aspire to get to the point of having enough money to be able to
fly anywhere any time. It was something that was a comfortable
position of wealth to which we could all aspire.
The '70s brought the beginning of democratization of the air-
line industry with 747s and DC-10s carrying more of us for less
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cost because we ended up with Super-Saver fares and things of
this nature. And with the Deregulation Act of 1978 and the ad-
vent of the '80s and deregulation, the tumult of the airline in-
dustry going through a revolution, ended up basically in causing
a complete re-definition of what the airline industry was. What
it clearly became was part of our way of life in the United States.
It was a new way of life available to all of us. And in the '90s,
that relation was cemented, although somewhat muddy, because
one of the things that we ended up doing was devaluing, deval-
uing the idea of transportation by airline to the point that we
would put an individual in one seat for $2,400 and seat next to
him an individual who paid $150 for the same ticket, and next
to that, somebody who was paying nothing because they were
using a frequent flyer award. In other words, we got confused
over the fact that it costs money, and a lot of it, to provide air-
line seats and to do it safely as we do.
Let me give you a couple of not just definitions, but I think,
axioms to get this started. These are the things that we want to
talk about today. The shock of September 11 th has caused us to
go back and redefine what this system is and what it means to us.
Axiom number one: The airline industry of the United States is
a vital and indispensable part of American life. Axiom number
two - and by the way, these are axioms that everybody can
shoot at - The airline industry of the United States is a vital
and indispensable necessity for American business, for the con-
duct of American business. Axiom number three: The airline
industry of the United States is a vital and indispensable pillar of
our economic stability. That's another one that we need to look
at.
How do we make it safe after September 11th? How do we, as
a nation, ensure its survival? And should we? What are the con-
sequences of failure to whatever degree? Those are the issues
on the table. I'd like to start by turning this over to Dr. Michael
Cox, who's been gracious enough to come to talk to us about
the fiscal side.
Dr. Michael Cox
I must tell you before we get started here that I'm not from
the airline industry. I'm from the Fed. I'm not here really rep-
resenting the airline industry. I have no air transportation prod-
uct to sell you. What that means is that I hope to bring you just
some facts. You can make up your mind about how important
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the airline industry is to the economy from those facts and how
safe air travel is and so on.
Let me give you a little history of the airline industry. I want
to look at air transportation and the overall economy. First,
Americans first started to fly commercially around 1926. This
data takes you back to 1930 and shows that the number of air
miles traveled per capita. So today, the typical American flies
about 2,300 miles a year. That is the total number of miles this
nation flies divided by the total number of people, including
babies and including people who don't fly at all. This is just a
simple ratio just to show you how big this industry has become.
In 1971, about half the population had flown on an airplane
during their life, population age 17 or older. The latest statistic
we have on this from the Air Transport Association of America is
that about four-fifths of Americans have flown during their life-
times, age 17 and over. In 1971, one-fifth of us had flown over
the last year. Today, it is twice that many, two-fifths. And of
course, many of those people do not just fly once or twice a year.
They fly a lot. It's like me. I fly probably 100,000 miles a year
minimum.
In 1950, we had about 6,400 airports total, including public
and private airports. We have three times that many today,
19,000 airports. One of the reasons, one of the greatest reasons
that air travel has spread across the nation is it's become very
cheap. The jet set used to include society's wealthiest people.
Even Ricky and Lucy rode the train if you watch I Love Lucy. If
you were going to be an entertainer, you had to be at the level of
Peter, Paul, and Mary to get on a plane and fly. But today, of
course, the jet set includes all my students over at SMU who feel
it's their birthright to bop down to Cancun during the spring
break for $199 round-trip airfare. It's a way of life that, of
course, we enjoy, and we don't want to give up. I really don't
think we will. I'm convinced that we won't have to.
How many hours of work would you have to put into your job
for a typical middle-income worker in America in order to af-
ford to fly 1,000 miles? The answer is 221 hours of work back in
1926 but less than 10 hours of work will buy you 1,000 miles of
air travel today. That's just a little over a day of work. You can
get 1,000 miles via air travel. So, the reason it's become cheaper
is because it has become more prevalent in society.
Now, I want to argue that another reason that it has been -
has spread throughout society- is because never in the history
of mankind has there been a safer form of travel. On average,
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from 1903 to 1913, over 10,000 people died per year in train-
related accidents-10,000 per year. That's people on the track
and hobos. That's people in the trains. That's people working
in the yards. A lot of those people were passenger deaths.
America accepted that because train transportation was better
than by carriage, which was very risky itself. It was better than
traveling by a horse. It was inexpensive in terms of its toll on
human life even compared to other things at 10,000 people a
year.
Now, this is what we pay to be able to drive our cars. Ameri-
cans, over the five years on average, from 1946 to 1950, Ameri-
cans drove about 400 billion miles a year as a nation. Today, we
drive 1.5 trillion miles, on average, over the last five years. We
averaged, over the last five years, about 42,000 deaths per year.
That's about 120 tol30 a day. You can do your own math: Di-
vide it by 365. It equals 130 a day. That's how many people die
in automobile accidents. But we don't really report them. Why
don't we report them? Why don't we worry about them so
much? First, we don't report them because we don't have time.
If we were to show all 42,000 automobile deaths on TV every
year, time after time after time after time, like we showed that
plane, those planes, the 737, I guess, crashing into the twin
Trade Towers, you would never have time to watch all those
42,000 things. Second, you wouldn't get back in your car. An-
other reason people will continue to drive their car even with
this kind of risk is because they're behind the driver's seat, and
they feel more comfortable. But even the automobile industry is
succeeding at reducing the death rate down to about 83 people
per billion miles traveled, from 1946 to 1950 to 28. That is a
huge reduction in the death rate with air bags and things like
this.
How does this compare to air travel? Here's the air travel
data. Americans from 1946 through 1950 flew an average of
eight billion miles a year, and now we fly 630 billion as a nation.
The death rate per billion miles flown is 0.14. On average,
ninety have died from 1996 to 2000 in the United States in air-
related accidents-90, not 42,000. That rate of 0.14 is 1/194th
that of automobiles. Even including the deaths that happened
this year, this number is still an extremely low rate. If you were
to get on an airplane and fly and get off that plane and get on
another airplane and fly and do the same thing forever, your life
expectancy would go up. The reason is because you wouldn't be
driving your car. I'm not putting down cars. Don't get me
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wrong. I love the car industry. I drove over here. But I think we
have to get a grip on the cost benefit analysis that you and I and
every one of us face every year in every one of our activities.
What we're having right now is a tremendous amount of igno-
rance. The word "ignorance" doesn't mean stupid. It doesn't
mean dumb. It just means ignoring the facts, seeing the facts
and choosing to ignore them. We are ignoring the facts about
this, and in doing so, we are creating far too much scare around
air travel. I made a list of twelve things, which I'm not even
going to go over, of what we can do to make air travel more safe,
and some of which we're already doing. One of them happened
automatically.
Now, let me ask you this: How many people out there, if faced
with a situation like what happened on September 11th where
people start to take over the plane, how many people are going
to sit in their seat and do nothing? Hey, that means that the
likelihood of anybody standing up and saying, "I'm taking over
the plane" has just gone to zero if they have any sense at all.
They know that we know what happens with this plane. We're
not going to allow it. Therefore, we've already got 200 air mar-
shals on board. That's us. That's already happened. We just
need to realize that.
Now, let me rank for you what I see as the sectors most af-
fected by the terrorism incidents and the economy, and what
percent they are of the gross domestic product. Air transporta-
tion alone, just the service of air transportation, is about nine-
tenths or one percent of GDP. If you were to rank these sectors
by what's the most effective to the least effective, I would put a
nine by that one, and the only reason I don't put a ten is be-
cause even if we didn't transport people, we would still be trans-
porting packages.
Services to the transportation industry like travel and so on, of
course, gets heavily impacted. Hotels and lodging places are im-
pacted when folks don't travel for recreation and leisure. The
production of airplanes and even cars is impacted because we
don't need as many rental cars at the airports when people
don't travel. That gets impacted. Taxis that drive folks around
as part of interurban transit, the taxi drivers in the cities I've
gone to are complaining about the lack of passengers in their
taxis.
Business services, a portion of that is going to be affected be-
cause we don't have as many conventions. I've had three of my
conferences that I was speaking at cancel. Membership, organi-
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zations, the same thing. Even oil and gas extraction, we're not
going to use as much jet fuel if we're not going to fly as many
planes. That's affected. Retail trade is affected simply because
people spend some money when they're out touring and also
when they're at the airport. All of these sectors will be affected
to some degree.
If you add it all up and put some multiples on it, it would turn
out to be somewhere between a four and five percent reduction
in GDP if we were to wipe out the air transportation industry,
just a fact. That's far too much to allow the economy to have.
That would just be the first-round effects. Of course, that's not
going to happen. We're not going to allow the transportation,
that part of our lives, to be eliminated. There are too many
things we can do about it with technology and so on.
Now overall, this is the way the economy is broken up. GDP is
more diversified than ever. The entire transportation sector is
2.9 percent of GDP. I put this up here to give you some feeling
of good news. This is a very diversified economy. In 1947, if you
were to take agriculture, manufacturing, and retail trade, just
three sectors of the economy, it would have made up 49.7 per-
cent of the gross national product. Today those three sectors
make up only twenty-five percent of gross national product for a
much more diversified economy than ever. So, it's much harder
to hurt our overall economy. Thank goodness.
So, I say in conclusion, we should keep the faith. The first
coast-to-coast flight in 1930 was a $200 flight, which in averages
of that day, would have been 366 hours of work. Today, it's just
16 hours of work for a coast-to-coast flight. Two days of work
and you can get on a plane and fly coast-to-coast.
And finally, let's keep a perspective on this. There are some
people that like to talk about how inconvenient air travel has
become. But you know what? Some of society's richest people
were willing to get on this plane in 1930, American Airways - at
that time it was called American Airways - for a tri-motor
plane, fly 2,000 feet above the ground at 120 miles an hour,
making ten stops overnight, one of them in Kansas City, to get
to their destination in over two days. They carried all of their
luggage on board. They plugged their ears with cotton. The
plane wasn't pressurized. It wasn't heated or air-conditioned,
and their feet would swell and so on. They went through all this
inconvenience just to travel. I think that if rich people in society
back then would do it, certainly today we'll do it as well.
Thank you.
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John Nance (Panel Moderator)
We're privileged to have all these gentlemen here, but there's
one in particular that I want to point out. Chairman Al Casey
literally brought American Airlines to the Dallas-Fort Worth area
a long time back. The chairman has had a tremendous history
in aviation. Al, could we get you up here and then get your
perspectives, please?
Dr. Albert Casey
Everyone feels their industry is special and a major contribu-
tor to our economy-more than any other-and therefore, they
are due special consideration in times of panic caused by terror-
ism. Thus, the government and the public should understand
and be sympathetic-as theirs is a special case.
Now, the question is: are the airlines truly a special case?
Believe me, the airline industry is one of a kind. The public
generally views it as a public utility, and it expects our govern-
ment to protect it from monopolistic prices and unfair competi-
tion. But, of course, the airlines must continue to provide
bargain fares.
To date, the airline industry has been assigned $15 billion of
emergency funds-of which $5 billion has been distributed and
another $2 billion is ready to go. Also, the insurance industry
wants the government's help in covering future terrorist attacks.
The hotel, car rental, and fast food industries also all pronounce
themselves in need of governmental financial support.
President Bush's senior economic advisors told lawmakers on
October 24, 2002 that the nation would face an economic crisis
if Congress failed to guard the insurance industry against losses
from future terrorist attacks.
They said that construction, manufacturing, and other
projects in such industries as energy and transportation would
grind to a halt as bankers and others lenders stopped offering
loans or raised their rates because insurers were unwilling to re-
new their coverage for terrorist attacks.
Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill testified, "We're facing a cliff.
The administration believes the economy is a facing a tempo-
rary, but critical market problem in the provision of terrorism
risk insurance."
He went on to say, "Keeping our economy moving must be
our overriding concern. Leaving this problem unresolved
threatens our economic stability."
20021
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On September 25, 2002, under the most likely arrangement
to survive, the government would not provide any assistance un-
til after the insurance industry suffered significant losses, possi-
bly as high as $10 billion from any terrorist attacks next year.
Then, the government would contribute 70-90% above a de-
ductible. (The earlier plan proposed that the government cover
80% of the first $20 billion in losses next year and 90% of addi-
tional losses.) So, you can see the final terms are still in a state
of flux.
The Treasury, under O'Neill's plan, would have the authority
to audit insurers and force them to make disclosures. This
would be a new role for the federal government, which hereto-
fore, has left insurance regulation to the states. This agreement
is between the Senate Banking Committee and the White
House. The House of Representatives has yet to be heard from.
Thus, the pot boils, and the role of government aid becomes
ever more complex.
Now, the task of distinguishing deserving claims from bogus
ones starts with a simple question: does the distress in a given
industry cause only local hardship or does it cause wider chaos?
After the terrorist attacks, the Federal Reserve rightly offered
unlimited loans to the banking industry because cross-lending
between banks means that distress in one will spread quickly to
others and because distressed banks can destabilize hundreds of
businesses. By contrast, the closure of a particular hotel or fast
food chain has very few ripple effects.
The "Ripple Test" suggests why Congress was right to help the
airline industry. The closure of one or two airlines might not be
a bad thing. But the collapse of more than half the industry,
which seems possible, would hurt thousands of firms ,that rely on
air transport to move employees and goods.
The selection of which airline to help is a most delicate ques-
tion. The government must give money only to the airlines that
can prove they are viable. This might require renegotiating la-
bor contracts, airline purchase commitments, and other obliga-
tions. Today, there are at least two to three hundred surplus
commercial airplanes available, and some estimate this number
to be as high as one thousand. This, of course, lowers the collat-
eral value of planes already owned.
As an aside, the September l1th crisis has caused United
States industry to rethink many accepted business practices. For
example, once all planes were grounded on that fateful day,
PANEL DISCUSSION
there was chaos in the plants depending upon 'Just in Time"
inventory procedures.
Several plants closed at Alliance airport, just north of D/FW
or came alarmingly close to it. Businesses are grappling with
striking a balance between 'Just in Time" and 'Just in Case"-
that is of staying efficient-while boosting the security of supply
chains. Executives are weighing the need to accept some redun-
dancies and inefficiencies in their operations, possibly increas-
ing inventory levels and maybe even locations. Both Ford and
General Motors shut down production at plants in the days fol-
lowing the attacks.
Now, a bit of history: In the late 197 0's, Bob Crandall and I
fought a losing fight against the "Deregulation of U.S. Airlines."
The outcome of the legislation was foreseeable due to the cli-
mate of the time, namely-"Let free competition determine
prices and services"-and "get government off the backs of pri-
vate enterprise."
Following de-control, all airlines wanted to put their planes in
the air for as long as possible on long-haul routes, which are the
most profitable. Thus, the routes of American Airlines, which
were basically then trans-continental and semi trans-continental,
were popular targets for other airlines. And we knew this.
Subsequent facts bore this out. Eastern Airlines came into the
cross-country flight arena with a $99 fare, which had to be
matched due to the fact there is little or no product differentia-
tion. And the long road downhill for the industry was on its way.
American fought deregulation for years by pointing out that
markets like New York City and Los Angeles were awarded to
TWA, United, and American only if we, in turn, agreed to pro-
vide service to Providence, Rhode Island and stations in upper
New York. Thus, under the Civil Aeronautics Board, the airlines
were used to help develop the country. This practice is similar
to land grants to the railroads and many homestead acts in the
Nineteenth Century.
All this programmed expansion of service to less populated
areas went off the board when airline deregulation legislation
passed. And, as it was easily forecast, the smaller markets were
abandoned by the airplanes. Some retained propjet service, but
for the most part, airlines withdrew from the markets that had
been forced on them by the Civil Aeronautics Board, which inci-
dentally, went out of business.
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Thanks to Bob Crandall and his team, by the time deregula-
tion became effective in October 1979, I believe, American was
more prepared than most to operate under the new guidelines.
We worked during all the delays we caused. First came the
establishment of the hubs in Chicago and Dallas. Then Super-
Saver fares, followed by Yield Management, which is important.
The latter was a new process to open reservations a year before
the scheduled flight date and control the seat availability and
prices as the flight date approached.
Now, during the Darwinian struggle of the 1980's following
deregulation, dozens of airlines folded. They either went bank-
rupt or were acquired by the survivors. The remaining few-
United, Delta, Continental, Southwest, Northwest and Ameri-
can-expanded and competed fiercely on prices, leg-room, loy-
alty programs, and alliances with foreign carriers. Others, such
as US Air, did not have the financial strength to compete
effectively.
As the battle went on into the 1990's, operating costs rose ex-
ponentially, particularly the largest cash drains. Every airline
has three enormous cash drains: cost of aircraft, payroll, and
fuel prices. The cash drains went through the roof. Life in the
airline industry became very, very difficult.
The possibility that United and US Air might merge in the
mid-1990s was a distinct threat to American. Also, the emer-
gence of Continental and Southwest, the lucky devils that didn't
serve meals, they haven't have a problem, because we're not go-
ing to serve meals now either. This development coupled with a
shaky economic outlook was certainly enough to cloud the out-
look for the fall of this year.
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, there was
total panic in the airline industry at the highest level. It is no
wonder. No industry in our history has ever faced such a sud-
den crisis or such an uncertain outlook. It is staggering-over-
whelming-truly incomprehensible that it actually happened.
Since all U.S. flights were grounded on September 11th, the air-
lines have bled about $1 billion. The immense losses are contin-
uing because the airlines are now flying, at the most, half full.
Now, for a quick look at some of American's competitors. US
Air was particularly hurt by the closing of Regan National Air-
port in Washington, D.C. Many passengers are finding they can
easily drive the distance of many US Air's short-hop east coast
routes.
PANEL DISCUSSION
Today, US Air is frequently mentioned as one of the two or
three most likely candidates to seek bankruptcy law protection.
It is the leading carrier at Reagan National with 45% of the air-
port's daily departures, including its premium-fare business
shuttle flights to New York and Boston. Last week, it cut 11,000
jobs and said it would reduce its capacity by 23%. Also, it an-
nounced that it is retiring more than 111 jets from its fleet by
April 2002. US Air is essentially a regional airline with the cost
structure of a big international carrier, flying too many short
routes, which are not balanced by enough lucrative long hauls.
Like its competitors, US Air is in a survival mode today, strug-
gling to secure its federal bailout, recalibrate a reduced flying
schedule, and let go thousands of workers. But at the same
time, it has one of the most sympathetic audiences imaginable.
The members of Congress are heavy users of airlines at Regan
National Airport.
Now, as to America West. America West, and you may not
know this, is a big airline. It is the eighth largest airline in the
country. Today, they have less than $80 million in cash, down
from $124 million in June 2001.
Mr. Douglas Parker, CEO of America West, said, "We need a
cash infusion immediately or we shall have to seek shelter in
bankruptcy court." It has drawn down the maximum $95 mil-
lion on its revolving line of credit. It is already working with its
vendors, asking them to delay demands for payment.
Now, as to Delta, Mr. Leo F. Mullin, Chairman and CEO, has
become a leading spokesman for the airline industry in our Na-
tion's capital. To quote him, "This is a tidal wave that unabated,
could engulf us all."
Their loads are abysmal with fewer than half the seats occu-
pied while operating costs, in the face of tighter security, are
spiraling. As a result, Delta plans to reduce its capacity by fif-
teen to twenty percent.
Delta is the least unionized of the major airlines, with only its
pilots and a handful of dispatchers and pilot ground instructors
having union status, which of course gives them more flexibility
than the rest of us. It has one of the strongest balance sheets in
the industry, with $2.5 billion in cash and a relatively low debt-to
capital ratio.
Delta owns almost $9 billion in unencumbered aircraft. How-
ever, Moody's Investor Service and Standard and Poor's cut
their debt rating on Delta's debt to junk bond level in the wake
of the Trade Tower attacks. The debt ratings of other U.S. air-
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lines have also been downgraded, and, today, Delta boasts the
second strongest rating after Southwest Airlines.
As Delta's Mr. Mullin was quoted, "We are clearly one of the
very best in terms of financial strength. However, all of the air-
lines will need help, including those in the best of financial
shape."
Now, as to Northwest Airlines. Without government assis-
tance of $249 million in September and excluding "one-time
items," the airline would have lost $100 million. But thanks to
the help, it reported earnings of $19 million compared to $207
million a year earlier. Northwest suspended service for four
days and reduced its flight schedule by twenty percent, permit-
ting a reduction of 10,000 jobs. They reported that their daily
cash loss is about $7 million a day.
To save themselves, the airlines are frantically cutting jobs, ap-
proximately 20,000 a piece for United and American and indus-
try wide 1,200,000 for 2001.
The AMR Corporation, the parent of American Airlines,
posted the largest quarterly loss in its history last Thursday after
an already difficult third quarter was turned into a financial dis-
aster by the September 11th terrorist attacks. AMR, which
bought Trans World Airlines this year and is now the world's
largest carrier, lost $414 million, or $2.68 per share in the third
quarter, compared with a profit of $313 million, or $1.91 a
share, in the period a year ago. Everyone is breathless.
Without the company's share of the $5 billion in emergency
cash assistance given to the industry by the federal government,
AMR's quarterly loss would have been $922 million-evidently
they have already received $500 million.
On Thursday, October 25, 2001, the Department of Transpor-
tation said it is ready to distribute another $2 billion in airline
aid.
Despite paring twenty percent of its flight schedule and cut-
ting 20,000 jobs, AMR expects to lose $10 million to $15 million
a day during the current quarter.
Even before September 11th, the airline industry was facing
one of its worst downturns ever. Revenue for each seat mile
flown was down ten percent as the boom in business travel of
the late 1990's ended abruptly. But after the attacks, revenue
per seat mile plunged to forty percent.
American plans to ground seventy older jets and has cut ex-
penses such as in-flight meals. The airline has also cut its capital
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budget for next year in additional $2.5 billion after trimming $1
billion before the attacks. The airline will defer twenty-nine of
the forty-five jets it expected to receive next year from the Boe-
ing Company until after 2003.
Counting the government aid, $820 million borrowed the day
after the attacks, and $1.6 billion raised by mortgaging some of
it's planes, AMR has $2.3 billion in cash. It also has $8 billion
worth of airplanes it can borrow against.
Incidentally, on October 25, 2001, ground workers voted 94%
in favor of a three-year deal. These unions represent nearly
55,000 employees-or almost 50% of the total. Flight attend-
ants-about 23,000-approved their contract on September 12,
2001, the day after the crashes.
As for American's arch rival United Airlines, last week, James
E. Goodwin, UAL's Chairman and Chief Executive, told employ-
ees that costs were exceeding revenue at four times the rate
before September 11 th, when the company was already posting
huge losses. He warned that if the situation did not change,
UAL would "perish sometime next year." United will announce
its earnings on November 1, 2001. Also, over the weekend Mr.
Goodwin was let go and replaced by a Board member. Remem-
ber, United now has union representatives on its Board of Direc-
tors. Chaos prevails.
Airlines simply cannot cope with a sharp fall in revenues.
They are capital-intensive and need to maintain a network of
service, which means high-fixed costs. Airplanes cost up to $200
million each, and an airline must fill three-quarters of its seats to
make money. Even a fall of five percent in traffic can wreck the
operating economics.
Before September 11th, this country's airlines were forecast-
ing losses of $3 billion. Now, that number will be at least $5
billion for 2001.
In closing, let us pause and look at the United States airline
industry as an investment. In my opinion, absolutely no one
that had an ounce of intelligence or advanced business training
would turn to the airlines for either investment or career pur-
poses. The airlines are capital intensive, labor intensive, and
cyclical. I believe more dollars and more ambitions have disap-
peared down this vortex than any other in our society.
Throughout the years, the industry has only been sporadically
profitable-since Wilbur Wright pushed brother Orville off the
bicycle seat eighty-five years ago.
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Remember what Bob Crandall told you yesterday. From Kitty
Hawk to 1992, the airlines lost $15 billion; then from 1993-
1999-they made $28 billion. And that is rapidly disappearing
this year. Its service offerings are in units of 100 seats or more.
Thus, if it can't reduce its product supply proportionately to a
shrinking market, many other industries can.
As the economy slows, it is most difficult to adjust in the short
run, so it oversupplies product. Its most productive period is
when the economy is turning up and more seats are filled
before we realize it. It is a highly visible service business with all
the problems and pleasure associated with accommodating the
traveling public. It is exciting and in a constant state of flux-
highly competitive, and plays and integral role in our business
world.
Yes, I believe it should receive government financial assis-
tance. However, it should receive this aid on a highly selective
basis. And therein lies the problem.
My role here is to pose this problem. Your role is to propose
the solution.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There's another gentlemen here
who we have to call "Mr. Chairman" too. He's a gentleman I
have watched for many years take a noble institution and make
it even more noble, the National Transportation Safety Board,
under the tutelage of Jim Hall, achieves new heights of perform-
ance and reliability as one of the elements of the heart and soul
of aviation safety. Jim, thank you very much for being here.
Come on out.
James Hall
It is an honor to be here. But had I known I was going to have
to follow Dr. Casey, I would have declined. I want to compli-
ment the Dean and the students for putting this panel together.
I assume that classes have been let out because it is so well at-
tended. I really think it is very important.
We live in a very small world brought together by aviation and
by communication. For so many to be actively involved in what
obviously is an event that is going to impact the rest of your lives,
I want to compliment the school for doing that.
I am honored to be a part of such a distinguished panel. I
had the honor to work at the NTSB and serve as Chairman for
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seven years. The NTSB is responsible for the oversight of trans-
portation in all modes of transportation, not just aviation. Thus,
I was extremely interested in Dr. Cox's presentation on trans-
portation safety because the Board is involved with highway,
marine, and railroad safety, as well as pipeline and hazardous
materials safety. All are very important issues.
To the subject of freedom versus fear. Obviously, we all have
a lot to fear because all of us have the images of September 11 th
in our mind. The public is going to have a difficult time dealing
with those images as we try to rebuild the confidence in the se-
curity of our aviation system. This conference could not be
more timely.
A very important debate is taking place in Congress on the
issue of strengthening commercial aviation security. In fact, two
very prominent Texans are heavily involved with this debate:
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson and Congressman Dick Armey.
Before being elected to serve on the Senate, Senator Hutchin-
son served as acting chairman and vice-chairman of the NTSB.
I have been concerned about this debate because I feel that
much of it is centered on the question of whether pre-board
screening operations at the nation's airports should be com-
pletely federalized. While the sometimes partisan debate over
federalizing airport screeners is well-intended, it has in my view
focused on the wrong subject. The main focus should not be on
whether screeners should be government employees or private
contract workers, but rather on what caused the problem in the
first place.
The inadequacies of our aviation security screening, as well as
the system as a whole are the result of a deeply flawed system
caused by the collective failure of the government and the air-
lines to provide a structure that is adequately funded and con-
tains provisions of accountability. These problems cannot be
explained simply by pointing a finger at private-sector screening
personnel. Rather, they are the result of the government - at
the urging of the airlines and others - to leave the responsibility
up to individual airports and airlines, which in turn, demand
private bid packages that force contractors to pay hourly wages
barely competitive with fast-food hamburger chains. And it re-
sulted in a system so loose that even convicted felons were able
to gain employment as screening personnel.
As a member of the White House Commission on Aviation
Safety and Security during my tenure as Chairman of the Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board, I toured and studied airport
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security programs at numerous domestic and international air-
ports. It was apparent then, as it has become painfully so now,
that the American system was woefully inadequate. That Com-
mission made a multitude of recommendations to begin improv-
ing the safety of our air transportation system, including
increasing the professionalism of passenger screeners. Al-
though some have been implemented, more work needs to be
done.
As part of the multifaceted response to the September 11th
tragedies, the Senate has approved legislation that would make
pre-board screeners federal employees. The House of Repre-
sentatives, meanwhile, is preparing to debate the status of
screeners as part of its version of aviation-security legislation.
Many House conservatives and moderates are opposed to staff-
ing passenger-screening posts with a new cadre of federal
workers.
While there are persuasive arguments being made on both
sides of this issue, I believe that private-sector contractors are
fully capable of handling the job if there is a system of govern-
ment oversight that will provide adequate levels of funding to
put in place the newest technology and to implement a positive
bag match program. We need to focus on not just the passen-
gers, but obviously on the security of the entire aircraft and sys-
tem. It also must ensure high levels of pre-employment
screening, ongoing training and, most importantly, accountabil-
ity. These steps must be taken regardless of whether the system
is federal or private.
There are many examples of the effective use of private con-
tractors in high-security areas. The Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, for example, allows the use of private security personnel to
help safeguard the nation's nuclear reactors, materials, and
waste facilities. This approach succeeds because private contrac-
tors operate under an oversight system that holds them to high
professional standards and does not force bargain-basement
competitive bidding.
The point is that the litmus test on the best way to increase
aviation security should not be on whether airport screeners are
federal employees or private contractors. Rather, it should be
on which system has the best chance of succeeding and guaran-
teeing security over the long run. Only through a system-wide
approach can we ensure the timely implementation of technol-
ogy and the highest level of security for all Americans.
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I believe one solution lies in a public-private partnership that
puts together the advantages of both. The best model for this
can be found in the United Kingdom. Under the British system,
either private-sector contractors or public airport personnel per-
form pre-board passenger screening under strict government
oversight. They are held to very high standards. This system
works. But regardless of what Congress decides on this particu-
lar issue, it ultimately must address the aviation security system
as a whole. I am confident that the members of the House and
Senate in conference will accomplish this task when they marry
the two bills.
The responsibility for implementing this new system and en-
suring that new regulatory standards are met should be placed
in the new Office of Domestic Security, where clean lines of ac-
countability can be established. It should not be buried within
the multi-layered bureaucracies found in the departments of
Justice and Transportation. Additionally, I believe an indepen-
dent board or agency that would function much like the NTSB
should be created to serve as an integral part of a new system of
checks and balances. In essence, it would be a watchdog on be-
half of the American public regarding aviation security. And it
can be in place once our attention and the attention of the me-
dia has moved from this important issue.
The U.S. aviation safety system, which Dr. Cox gave you the
statistics on, has been a model for the world because of the hard
work of FAA regulators, airline employees, and the dedicated
employees of the NTSB, who continually monitor the system
through its investigations of accidents and incidents. The inde-
pendent safety board has never been afraid to speak out to pro-
tect the interests of the traveling public. There needs to be a
similar independent voice to ensure that those responsible for
aviation security are held accountable.
As it deliberates, Congress needs to remember that the system
failed - not individuals. If a new security system, such as the one
I have described, is implemented, concerns regarding private-
sector passenger screeners will be moot.
The time for decisive action is now. It is imperative for Con-
gress to make the systemic changes that are needed, not only to
address the problems of the past, but also to create a model of
security that is strong enough - and flexible enough - to keep
us safe and to rebuild confidence in the future. I would en-
courage those of you who-because I think you will be the users
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of this new system-continue as you are doing. Follow this de-
bate, be knowledgeable, and express your opinion.
Thank you.
Ray Hutchinson
Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, I'm delighted
to be back at SMU and am delighted to be with this distin-
guished group. I'm going to talk very briefly about a subject
that you don't hear a lot about but is so intimately involved in
this whole process of security as a result of September 11
activities.
When I was looking at Dr. Cox's slides a little while ago of the
planes flying at 2,000 feet, I remember that in the regulated en-
vironment, that was also referred to by Al Casey, the CAB or-
dered that airlines taking off from Love Field in Dallas in planes
looking about like some of the three-motored jobs that Michael
mentioned, must take off at Love Field, fly 2,000 feet across the
county line and land at an airport called Greater International
Airport and pick up passengers there before it could go to Aus-
tin, and then reverse it coming back.
The population of this community, North Texas, as well as the
governmental intervention, had enough in about 1967. The two
cities, after about 20 years of wars over where we're going to fly
these airplanes, were told by the CAB that, "If you don't settle
the war, we're going to order that Dallas and Forth Worth be
overflown and that if you want to go to New York, you've got to
go to Houston first," and vice versa. That got the movement
under way to create in the beginning of 1968 what we now know
and call the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport.
It's been my happy experience as a lawyer to represent that
airport since the two cities were not speaking to each other.
And this is a literal truth. The city attorneys would not speak to
each other. They'd see each other on the street from Dallas and
Forth Worth. One would take the other side. So, they needed a
third party, someone who at least could go and knock on the
door and hopefully get it opened. That was my luck as a young
lawyer.
Having represented D/FW, Houston Intercontinental, Austin
Bergstrom, El Paso International, and having been involved in
Memphis and others, with Federal Express and Alliance, it's
been an experience in which we sometimes lose sight of why it's
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relative and relevant. In particular, we sometimes fail to ask the
question that's so important: Who pays for this?
It may surprise you to learn that D/FW Airport, like most of
the major airports in the nation, are not supported by tax dol-
lars, that is, local tax dollars. They're not supported by contribu-
tions from the owners. Dallas and Fort Worth do not pay money
from property taxes or sales taxes to support D/FW or Love
Field. So the question is who pays for it?
Then, there's some other questions that are equally impor-
tant. That is some rather fundamental self-truths. It takes at
least two airports to have a system. You can't have just one. So,
the question then is who pays for both of them? If you have any
kind of system at all, you may need a few more in order to make
it a system of public transportation. And who pays for them?
Then you've got to ask the question, well, who's going to use it?
You've got to have at least one airline that's healthy. If you
don't have that one, you don't even have a chance. And the fact
of the matter is, if you have only one, you don't have a chance.
It's an industry that feeds on itself. Airports are an integral
part of the system of air transportation. They are paid for by no
one other than the airlines themselves and occasionally,
through passenger service charges and the like that the federal
government authorizes in interstate commerce. They're paid
for almost exclusively by the airlines.
An airport is a part of the public infrastructure. It's like a
street, a sewer system, a city hall, and the fact is, that the day you
build it, it begins to get old. It deteriorates immediately. It
stops its value. The minute you cut the ribbon, you go buy the
concrete for the repairs. That's the life, the same life that we
live, and the public infrastructure lives the same way. Thus, on
September l1th, that occurred at a time at D/FW when they
were in the process of trying to arrange for the financing of any-
where from $3 to $5 billion of public infrastructure improve-
ments. The same is true at Houston Intercontinental. The
same is true at JFK in New York. The same is true all over this
nation. There are literally billions and billions of dollars of
bonds that are payable from the revenues of an airport that are
owned by guess who? As we used to say in law school in the old
SEC classes, the widows, the orphans, and those folks.
How they're going to be paid if you don't have an airline, at
least one? On September 14th of this year, Moody's and Stan-
dard & Poor, that rates all municipal bonds in the country, is-
sued a press announcement placing all North American airports
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on credit watch. The ability to finance public infrastructure in
that area halted immediately. They decided and announced
that this does not mean that every airport is bankrupt. But it
says, "We want to freeze things in place until such time as we can
analyze each airport on a case-by-case basis. And then we can
make a determination as to whether the widows and orphans
ought to be asked to loan more in the future."
In much of the aviation industry, the question is still unan-
swered. But I've got some numbers that we've just completed in
order to address that thatjust may give you some sense of relativ-
ity of what's happening at the airports after September 11th in
fact, not what the airlines say, not what investors may fear, what's
happening, what's really happening.
Airports are paid for by airlines based on, generally speaking,
landings and takeoffs. If you land and take off, you pay rent. If
you're the only airline standing, you get the whole bill. And you
effectively have the privilege, American, if you want to be the 70
percent dominant carrier at D/FW, that means you're going to
get the privilege of paying 70 percent of the costs after you de-
duct the rent to the hot dog vendors and so forth.
But that's the way it works. In D/FW, these are numbers
taken from published materials from the Official Airline Guide.
They give the jet departures in November of 2000 and compare
them with September of 2001 and then November of 2001 based
on the projections. Jet departures at Dallas-Fort Worth are
down by thirteen percent from November of 2001 and fourteen
percent from in September compared with November of 2001.
That's not bad.
Given the environment, relatively speaking, that's pretty good.
If you look at Los Angeles, for example, these are domestic,
they're down twenty-five percent. This doesn't say it gives you
the number - we give you the number of seats that are availa-
ble. It doesn't give you passengers because that's not relevant to
an airport. The airline pays based on landings and weight of the
aircraft, not who's riding in it. So, that's how they're financed.
But the usage is down.
In the international arena, this is extremely difficult. New
York JFK is down twenty-one percent. Honolulu is down about
thirty-five percent. Dallas-Fort Worth is down twenty-three per-
cent in the international arena. And then you look at some of
the others: Minneapolis, LaGuardia, Pittsburgh, and others. It
soars. This is what's happening. This is why these issues are
important.
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The question is how do you reverse it? Obviously, you reverse
it as it relates to airport financing. You reverse it by getting the
aircraft flying again, more than one, at more than one airport.
The way you do that is to restore confidence, we believe, in the
traveling public, that it really is safe. And I wish they could have
seen Michael Cox's presentation in that regard, and I'll be
happy to review any of these other numbers with you later.
Thank you.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Before we go any further, and I wanted to bring the Dean into
the conversation, Dr. Michael Cox has got to leave very shortly.
If any of you have any questions you've been harboring for him,
before we get the general discussion started, I'd like to go ahead
and open the floor for Dr. Cox. Any burning questions from
the audience here?
Q: How has Dallas-Forth Worth been affected by the down-
turn in air travel and the way the business is?
Dr. Michael Cox
Well, not just Dallas-Fort Worth, but Texas as a whole. Texas
as a whole is being hit by four things right now: Number one,
the airlines are a large part of our industry, of our economy. Of
course, Southwest is not being affected as much as, say, the
other airlines, but still they're being affected. Houston is a hub
for Continental. So, airlines are a big part of our overall econ-
omy, our airports. The second thing we're being affected by is
that it's much more difficult to get immigrant workers back and
forth across the borders. Sometimes the wait is four hours just
to go one way.
So, there are not as many shoppers coming from Mexico up
to America. There are not as many workers coming from Mex-
ico to America as there used to be. That's kind of hard for the
economy to take. The third thing is that oil and gas, of course,
prices haven't gone up, which is in Texas. As the net supplier of
those, in fact, it probably has slipped a little bit, which brings in
less revenue for us. What is the fourth thing? Then you can
[unintelligible] our economy, yes. Our proximity to Mexico not
for border things, but just for, say, maquiladoras. The maqui-
ladora industry is taking a big hit in Mexico. As United States
residents buy fewer manufactured goods in an economic slump,
fewer of those folks have money that they can spend on import-
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ing goods, which in Texas, is more impacted by that than any
other state in the nation.
Texas used to lead the nation in growth. For the past ten to
twelve years, we have grown faster than the rest of the nation.
The unfortunate anecdote is that we're probably growing slower
than the nation now if we're attracting a little bit more because
of the quadruple whammy we've received. It's not as bad as you
would think.
When Texas got hit by the drop in oil prices from $30, $40 a
barrel to $12 or whatever it was back in '85, '86, we had the
British Parliament come to Texas about five years after that and
ask us, "How did you do that? How did you recover from that?"
We just re-grew in a whole bunch of other sectors. Texas will do
that. Texas is a very resilient state and has ability to recover
from - to take the licking and keep on ticking probably better
than just about any state in the country.
James Hall
Absolutely. We survived Sam Houston, didn't we? I'm sorry,
ladies and gentlemen. Thank you. Dr. Cox, let me ask one
question before we get to the gentleman down here. And that is
this: We hear figures of a dollar and the economy turns so many
times, three-and-a-half, three times. I don't know what the cur-
rent wisdom is on that. If we invest a dollar of public money in
the airline industry as we have just done, the $5 billion, how
many dollars in terms of public overall economic benefit do we
end up seeing that represent?
Dr. Michael Cox
Nobody has done an input/output analysis on the air trans-
port sector, to my knowledge. I sat down and tried to do some
truly back-to-the envelope calculations on this, trying to take ac-
count of the so-called collateral damage from the airline indus-
try. If the airline industry gets hit and that spills over into other
things, then eventually the last little ripple, and you add it all up,
what does it wind up being? So, if I had to give - if you forced
me to give an answer, I would say somewhere between $4 and
$5.
James Hall
A significant amount, in other words.
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Q: That kind of ties into the question I was going to ask.
Could the airline industry stand another September l1th? We
have the traditional warnings that something's going to happen,
something's going to happen. That's very obvious, a very high-
profile -
James Hall
I think the answer is yes. But I don't think it will have to. I
certainly don't. I think the airline travel today is five times, at
least, safer than it was on September the 11th, at least. We have
so many things. Let me just get my list up here. Let me list
twelve ways that airline travel is safer or can be made safer, and
will be made safer. Some of it's already happened.
Number one, and these are in no particular order. Number
one, the installation of more substantial, bulletproof entry doors
between the cockpit and the cabin; number two, people aren't
talking about doing this necessarily, but we're thinking about
arming - not necessarily following through with it - arming
the pilots and teaching them martial arts; number three, having
the ability to release some kind of sleeping gas into the cabin
that puts the passengers to sleep; putting plain-clothes air mar-
shals on the planes; having the Air Force fly scrambling missions
to shoot down planes - nobody's going to fly a plane if you're
going to shoot it down - using iris scanners at the airports and
linking the scans to passengers' data or criminal databases; put-
ting airport security in the hands of somebody else, changing
the system for more accountability I think is the number one
thing. We've got to have accountability here. If I go to the doc-
tor for my toe on my left foot and he cuts off my right foot, the
doctor is accountable for his mistakes. And if we have accounta-
bility, then we'll have better security. We'll fix the system.
Number eight, random searching through passengers' carry-
on luggage; number nine, prohibiting the carry-on of some kind
of weapons or guns or something. They can't even have tweez-
ers. These are things we've done. Number ten is what I men-
tioned earlier. The image that we have all burned into our
brain right now of what happens if you let this plane be taken
over by the hijackers, in other words, passengers fight back.
Number eleven, stopping the policy of negotiating with ter-
rorists. We had a policy before this. My understanding was that
if somebody hijacks a plane, ask them where they want to go.
But if you stop negotiating with terrorists, they don't have any
incentive to. Number twelve, and I think one of the most impor-
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tant things is disable - it's my understanding that most of the
modern jets have the ability to disable the transponder and then
have the plane be landed by the final approach spacing tool,
which an air traffic computer would land the planes in Dallas.
If the person who gets control of the plane cannot take the
plane where they want to and somebody on the ground control
says, "Whoops, no longer getting any signals of this plane" and
they land it, you can't take the plane where you want to. There
are so many ways that technology and common sense can solve
this problem. I don't think we'll have to solve that again, that
problem. Anyway we have so many lines of defense and offense.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Dean, you had something that you really wanted to kick off
with before we get a back and forth going.
John Attanasio
Yeah. I didn't know I was going to have a placard. When I
saw a placard, I figured I'd say something.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
He who has a placard must -
john Attanasio
There's one very important issue, which seems to me has been
ignored. I do Constitutional law. There are at least three gov-
ernmental powers that are involved here under the Constitu-
tion, which would make it necessary for the federal government
to do policing here. The first one and the most obvious one is
the power of interstate commerce and the power to control in-
ternational commerce. This is probably the central regulatory
power of the national government. It is the power that trans-
formed the United States from a group of states into a nation. If
there's anything that strikes me that is centrally interstate com-
merce, it's air travel.
Virtually every plane that gets boarded goes interstate. And
even the ones that don't link up with other planes that go inter-
state. Many of the planes go international. The power of inter-
state commerce gets talked about a lot more than international
commerce. But the Congress has the power to regulate both,
and indeed, has taken on the responsibility to regulate both.
The second power is the central power of the executive branch
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is the police power. The central power of the executive branch
is the power to enforce the law. And to have handled all the
policing of something as important, it always struck me as odd as
I'd go through the line.
To handle something as important as the policing of the air-
planes in a world in which hijacking has been a reality ever since
I was a young kid, and that's a long time ago, ever since 40 years
or something like that, hijacking's been a very stark reality,
seems foolish to me. Now, it is true September 11 th is a discon-
tinuous event. That is that in September 11th, the hijackers no
longer had the intent to use the plane as a means of transporta-
tion or to use the plane as a means to get their way for
something.
The transforming event of September thellth was to use the
plane as a weapon, indeed as a missile. That brings up a third
central power of the federal government, and with power comes
responsibility. That is the war power. Currently, if we listen to
what the federal government says, we are in a state of war. Con-
gress has all but declared war on the people who hijacked those
planes. And indeed, the act that occurred that day was an act of
war.
It seems to me that that's a third power, which behooves the
federal government to engage in regulation here. Even under
the most minimalist theory of the state, Milton Freedman, the
Nobel prize-winning economist from the University of Chicago,
posited a traffic cop theory of the state. Freedman said that if
the State does nothing else, it has to do policing. Freedman also
said it's an interesting sort of addendum to the State, the police
conception of the State, said that the State might have to regu-
late public utilities. That's been something that's been talked
about, and it seems to me, a good characterization of the air-
lines, particularly since they lose money routinely. As a public
utility, it strikes me as a real characterization.
Just to conclude, it strikes me as very odd that the federal gov-
ernment has not policed this area for such a long period of
time. It also strikes me as very odd that the federal government,
one month later, has not yet gotten its act together in terms of
policing, particularly in light of what's happened. And there's
one last point. There's an argument that gets made that the
cost of policing should be internalized to the air traveler. That
argument I could see going both ways prior to September 11th.
It seems to me that that argument is far less persuasive post-
September 11th than it was pre-September 11th. The reason is
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that the airlines that were impacted on September 11th, as terri-
ble as that event was to the passengers on those planes, for every
passenger who died, many others died, because the plane was
used as a weapon. At that point, the internalizing the cost, the
cost of what happened that day, was not solely borne by the trav-
elers who tragically traveled on that day. It was borne by the
people as well who occupied the World Trade Center, the Penta-
gon, and thank God, the other buildings that were under attack,
but did not succeed.
With that in mind, it seems to me again that centrally this is a
police function, and centrally, this is a cost. It's a danger that all
of us face, whether we travel by air or not unfortunately. And
consequently, it's a cost that all of us should bear. Now, to sug-
gest who should do the policing, that is, whether private con-
cerns should be hired or whether the federal government
should hire its own employees, is a question which is not within
my range of competence. I have no idea what the right answer
to that is.
I do know that when Constitutional powers of this magnitude
are engaged, typically what happens is that the federal govern-
ment does it itself. If the federal government doesn't do polic-
ing itself at an extreme, and I mean extreme level of oversight
and regulation is going to have to take place. Otherwise, this
will continue to be something that in Sesame Street, where one of
the games played was "one of these things does not look like the
other."
It seems to me all the other police functions that we have that
are similar are run by the State. This one would be anomalous
in terms of being quite exceptional. Now, maybe a model like
the Nuclear Regulatory Agency might be a useful model. But in
any event, this will look very different from our other policing
functions. Even if it does, we have to take this very seriously. It
seems to me centrally a responsibility of the federal government.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Thank you. First of all, what this goes to the heart of, I think,
is one of the questions really that's before all of us here. We're
dealing with the question of not just how much government is
enough, but what is the role of government in very definite
form, in other words, a very specific form, and this goes to the
heart of the debate that's currently raging in the House over
how to do this. It goes back to the Deregulation Act of 1978,
which I've studied and lived with. All of us in aviation have lived
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with that and the question of whether or not there was a role for
government. The attitude at that time on a bipartisan basis was
that the baby and the bath water could be thrown out the win-
dow at the same time. There was no role for government. I
think we've regretted institutionally some of that, although
there are those like Dr. Alfred Kahn, who will fight to his dying
breath to say that no, this was the appropriate thing to do.
But without trying to rehash that, the question is still here.
What do we do as a people as expressed through our govern-
ment to solve the problems that may be extant to us at this point
that we've been talking about here in regard to the airline in-
dustry? And I think we start with that question. What should
the government do at this point? Let me open that for any of
the four of you.
Ray Hutchinson
They should take up as they're doing this week and address
first the obvious, and that's the Airport Security Bill because it's
the most immediate way to attempt to restore confidence in the
American people that flying is safe, which it is. But you've got to
win their confidence. I think they have to take the bill and ad-
dress it, and do it immediately. I share the concerns of others.
I'm astounded that they hadn't done it before now.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
We have a tendency to have a very short attention span in
modern America. Part of that may be the media. I may have to
put on my ABC hat and take some responsibility for that. But
the whole point is we do already see newspaper articles coming
out saying, "What's going wrong with the war?" It hasn't even
really started yet. We're seeing this kind of impatience. This is
going to be for the long haul. When you talk about, Ray, the
infrastructure of the airports and the difficulty of keeping the
financing going and the dropping of the number of flights, do
we have to look at a different way of financing the airports in
order to hold them in place?
Ray Hutchinson
I don't think so. I think that the airports of the country are
financed in an eminently fair manner. I think it is entirely ap-
propriate to impose the costs, the net bottom-line costs, on the
airlines. They do benefit from the public infrastructure and the
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public use. They then derivatively, ultimately the passenger pre-
sumably will pay that cost. But the fact of the matter is that the
airports are not an appropriate piece of infrastructure that
should be supported by general taxes on the homeowners or on
others, in my opinion, at the State and local level.
Now, at the federal level, I think this whole question of secur-
ity and what the federal government pays for and what it re-
quires should be debated, should be debated quickly, and
should be implemented quickly, because you've got to get these
numbers back up.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
That's what I'm hearing you say, is that we have a credit hold.
We have no municipality who can do anything right now. And
we've got another problem. I'd like to shift to you, Jim, on this
one. One of the things that the NTSB has done is led the way in
systemic analysis of accidents and understanding that nothing
ever happens for a single reason. There's always a multiplicity
of causation.
We have in the '80s a period of time in which the pressures of
the chaos of deregulation, and again, not to argue plus or minus
whether it should have been or shouldn't have been. But there
was a downward pressure in many boardrooms on how much
could be spent on safety. The definition of what was safe
enough was a constant question. We had senior vice presidents
of maintenance saying, "Look, I would love to build a new main-
tenance space. But I can't afford to do it." We had the FAA
saying, "These are the minimums not to which you should con-
sider standard, but that we don't' want you to sink below." How
are we going to keep the safety levels where they ought to be if
we've got airlines teetering on the brink of bankruptcy for these
various reasons?
James Hall
I think the same way we handle the highways. You have a user
tax, which is paid for partially through what you pay for your
ticket, and obviously, some through appropriate funds. This is a
situation; it's not a choice. If we don't make the necessary in-
vestment to rebuild the confidence with the American people,
then all the things that the doctors talked about and the other
panelists have spoken about, aviation is extremely important to
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our economy. It's extremely important to the number one word
you've got in your title here, our freedom.
We, as a nation, have got to come together and address this.
We can. But it cannot be done cheap. That's what happened in
the past. We tried to do security cheap. We can't do it this time.
We need to determine systematically what it's going to cost to do
it properly.
Ray Hutchinson
You mentioned what do you do now. What do you do now?
You try to approach the immediate - address the immediate
problem. But then you're going to have to ultimately address
other things. There are some crazy things. This is no secret in a
law school. But there are some crazy things in federal law.
Here, we're talking about the airlines. They're in trouble.
We're talking about writing them a check for $5 billion as the
first installment. Yet, all we've got to do is go to the tax code,
change the AMT mechanisms as it relates to airports in America,
eliminate them from it. That would produce incredible benefit
to guess who? The airlines. It would lower the cost of doing
business. That's a direct charge imposed by the federal
government.
I promise you, if you walk to Washington tomorrow, and you
walk up to somebody on the Ways and Means Committee, they
will say, "You want us to do what?" They'll say, "No way." That's
a problem. We've got a problem of communication, of public
policy communication. It's easier to address the question of
mechanically writing a check to some airline than it is to go into
the foundation for what makes up the incredible cost of doing
business? A lot of it is attributable to the federal government's
policies that are unnecessary and do not produce anything but
negatives.
Dr. Albert Casey
I don't really agree at all. We're not going to have an airline
industry unless we address it. Now, we're addressing it through
the supplementary agencies. We've got a Committee, Green-
span, and O'Neill. Greenspan doesn't want to be on it. He
wants someone else to do it. We've got to pick and choose and
keep the airlines, prove their viability, in the air.
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Ray Hutchinson
But why should I write you a check, from that committee,
write you a check at American Airlines so that you can turn
around and write a check back to me to cover the increased cost
of business that I've imposed on you?
Dr. Albert Casey
I'm not going to write you a check.
Ray Hutchinson




Under existing law you are.
Dr. Albert Casey
No. My employees and my fuel bills and rent on the airplanes
are State business. I think we're dancing away from that. Noth-
ing has happened. Who else is on the Committee? I know




There are about four of them on the committee. But I ha-
ven't done a thing. We've done nothing about picking and
choosing.
Ray Hutchinson
I don't quarrel with that. They need to get down to business.
But there are other things that can and must be addressed, Al.
You've got to address -
Dr. Albert Casey
You do it concurrently. You currently ignore this.
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Ray Hutchinson
I didn't mean you should ignore it, of course.
Dr. Albert Casey
It sounds as though you really didn't care.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
But what we're talking about is basically a methodology of
public support. When we're dealing with public support, one of
the questions is how much should there be in whatever form.
Q: [Inaudible]
Dr. Albert Casey
It is real. We haven't done a single thing about it. We haven't
identified [unintelligible].
Q: Well, even if we do that, if there's a bomb in it, I mean,
[unintelligible]
Ray Hutchinson
As Jim pointed out to some of us earlier, he did not mention
it in his remarks. But he reminded us that at Heathrow, I be-
lieve it is, at Heathrow they do precisely that. I think that the
failure to include that in the listing that Michael Cox was talking
about was just an oversight. I think that certainly I've heard of
the potential remedies or to have a complete remedy would in-
clude passenger baggage screening.
James Hall
I think that's why you have to look at the whole system. If you
don't address the subject of the baggage, you obviously have left
a huge hole. One of the problems that I've alluded to in the
attention on the screeners is that screeners aren't the only peo-
ple that are involved with - that are private employees, contract
employees. They have private contract employees that clean the
airplane now. Are we going to make them federal employees?
We have private employees now that do the pushback on the
plane. We have private employees that with a wheelchair go
through the security area into the aircraft with disabled people.
We have to have a system that looks at all of these possibilities.
It can be addressed in my opinion either way with federal em-
ployees or with private employees. But if we don't have a system-
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wide solution, we will have a solution that leaves a hole. Unfor-
tunately, we've seen how evilly brilliant these people are in find-
ing holes in our systems.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
By the same token, not to disagree in any way, but just to re-
fine this a little bit, it's true, I think, and jump on this, anybody
if you want to, that we've got to define very carefully. It's almost
like a cost benefit analysis. We can harden up certain things and
make them absolutely impervious to a hijacker who would be
either a September 11,htype or somebody else. It would be an
infinitesimally small hole that we were filling, in other words,
one that had very little chance of resulting in a hijacking.
We can also do some things that would be ruinously expen-
sive, basically technologically dangerous, and basically what I'm
referring to here is Dr. Cox talking about something. The Presi-
dent had some bad staff work and mentioned from Chicago a
number of days back, a number of weeks back, when he said
there was this device that might be able to bring the airplane in
and land it. Most of our airplanes have auto-land systems.
But you cannot automatically bring an airplane down with any
form of ground control today outside of a military aircraft. It
simply can't be done for many different reasons. First, our relia-
bility of electronics is not there yet. It'll be another ten or
twenty years with the redundancy necessary. Second, we have
flaps and gear that are not operable except for the human hand.
Therefore, you're not going to be able to get the flaps and gear
down. I would challenge you that landing automatically a gear-
up airplane is not a good idea with no flaps. That one's really
not a solution. But we could waste a lot of time and money on
it. So, I think we have to target pretty carefully.
John Attanasio
Well, there's no declaration of martial law. In a war situation,
there's not an absolutely formal declaration of war as I under-
stand it. There is a clear-cut check from the Congress for us to
pursue military action outside of the boundaries of the United
States. Even if we had a declaration of war, the Constitution,
and there are several Supreme Court cases in point, the Consti-
tution tends to differentiate between what happens within our
shores and what happens outside of our shores, and declara-
tions of martial law and things of that kind.
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The President would have some authority. There's been
some talk about implementing some things by executive order.
Depending on what it is, I would be wary about - a little wary
about that. The President can do certain things. But it seems to
me not to have Congress, which is one of the co-equal branches
of government, after all. And the framers looked at Congress as
the central policymaking body, centrally involved in this, I think,
probably is a mistake.
Your point about urgency though is something that's well-
taken, very well-taken.
Q: And I'm still at a loss as to figure out even Mr. Attanasio's
statement that echoed Robert Crandall's yesterday about imme-
diacy-immediacy and urgency. Who is responsible?
Ray Hutchinson
Well, there are a number of things that have been done. The
President put the National Guard in the airport. There are a
number of things that have been put in place. The President
does have the executive power to move in this area. I think the
President obviously understands that regardless of what he does,
someone has to pay for it. That's where Congress comes in.
That's why it's very important that in terms of this, whatever the
ultimate resolution of this is, it's done together between the
President and the legislative branch.
Q: People that are not flying, they're looking - they don't
believe that the first place is effective.
Ray Hutchinson
I don't disagree with you. I think this has not gotten enough
attention. We need to get someone in charge. But at the same
time, and I'm a card-carrying Democrat, so I'd express this opin-
ion. The President has had a very difficult situation. This is not
the only thing he has to address on his plate. Anthrax, of
course, is in the news now. We don't know what may be in the
news tomorrow. So, Congress needs to put this structure in
place, designate who's going to be responsible, and move for-
ward. I agree with you on that.
Q: How long would that take?
Ray Hutchinson
Well, hopefully we will see a - tomorrow there will be a vote
in the House on the Aviation Security Bill. I assume that they
2002]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
will hopefully move very closely to a conference and the final
passage of a bill within the next few days.
John Attanasio
Let's also talk about who's going to be the police force. That
is, the Senate has voted 100-nothing for it to be federal employ-
ees. And the House bill, which is also favored by the President,
is for it to be private contractors. However, I think the President
has declared that he would be willing to sign either bill. I think
that's what I've seen in the news.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
And one thing here. I think we also ought to get involved in
the question here too of what is it - not just what is it going to
take to get the public flying again, but is it just scared members
of the public who are causing this diminution of air traffic, or
isn't it a combination of that and business travelers who no
longer have the cash to be able to travel or perceive that they
don't for various reasons?
Q: [Inaudible]
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
None of us are talking about, are we, the idea of using subsidi-
zation to the point of reinvigorating profits just for survival
purposes.
Q: We didn't make any money.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Yeah, well, that's what Bob said yesterday.
Dr. Albert Casey
You're not going to make any money. You're going to just stay
alive.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
But there's another point here too, is there not? And that is,
when you look at the way the airline industry has developed and
Al, you're in a perfect position to comment on this. During the
'90s, there was a tremendous expansion. An awful lot of air-
planes had been ordered and bought. The reaction of our own
Boeing, and I live in the shadow of Mother Boeing up there in
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Tacoma, you know? We genuflect in the direction of the factory
every day. We know Boeing well. They came out with lightening
speed right after Bethune came out and said that he was going
to cut back 12,000 people, and made the staggering announce-
ment of how many Boeings we're going to cut back because
there were so many airplanes. In other words, it seems to me
that we are right at the edge now of seeing effectively what hap-
pens when you fine-tune a system so close to the edge that it
doesn't have any elasticity whatsoever to take a downturn. And




John Nance (Panel Moderator)
No? All right.
Q: [Unintelligible] problem for any airline executive really.
Q: Actually that [inaudible]?
Ray Hutchinson
You ask a number of things. Let me just say that can we solve
the problem? Yes. Can it be solved more efficiently and effec-
tively than it has in the past through rule-makings and not put-
ting anything in the system until it's gone through the whole
FAA test? We've got to have somebody in charge.
We've got to have somebody that says, "We're going to do this.
We're going to look for the technology." Obviously, if you buy
the technology en masse, you're going to drive the price per
unit down. But somebody has to take the responsibility and be
accountable to put a positive bag match in place in this country.
We cannot face terrorism in the future, which is going to be with
us probably, and with many of these students, for most of their
lifetime, without making the necessary investments for our
safety.
It can be done. The technology, most of this technology is in
place. There are people crawling over Washington, D.C. right
now. I've had three or four come visit me, each saying, "I've got
a new idea on how to solve this problem." If we loosen our crea-
tivity tied up in this problem, I think we can solve the problem.
But one size won't necessarily fit all at all airports. We've got to
have one level of safety. But some systems may need to be like
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Heathrow where every bag goes through three different screen-
ing devices before it's put on an aircraft. So, there are various
levels, I think, that can be put in place on this.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
I couldn't agree with you more in terms of the creativity. As a
matter of fact, it was very interesting. None of us knew. Even
those of us who know this industry real well, you may not have
known, Jim. I didn't, certainly. I remember talking about this
with somebody once before September 11th. Boeing already
has a door engineered. They've had it engineered for some
time that's impervious. Nobody ever wanted it.
James Hall
There's plenty of money out there to do this. I mean, our
problem is we've wasted money. The Denver Airport, for exam-
ple, right now, all the short-term parking has been shut down in
our country. We've spent millions of dollars. The Denver Air-
port is built on top of a parking facility. We have not designed
our airports or our system, the infrastructure that we've put so
much money into it, with security in mind. We need to change
that in the future so our airports are designed not as shopping
malls, but first, as areas that can provide security and then obvi-
ously, add the retail and others outside the security area.Q: My question is to Mr. Hutchinson. [Inaudible]
Ray Hutchinson
The emergency funds go strictly to the airlines. There has
been some talk about some kind of stand-by program should a
series of airlines go into bankruptcy or whatever and not be able
to pay. Could the federal government step in? The odds of that
going anywhere are pretty remote. In terms of the overall
health of the airports of the country, your major airports are in
pretty good shape financially. But it's simply because the air-
lines, even though they've had a reduction as these numbers
demonstrate, in their flights, they are still able to pay the bill.
Now, one very respectful observation of my friend here and a
remark he just made, you make an airport a shopping mall. The
question is where do you put the mall? But you have to make it
a mall in order to collect the rent, in order to reduce the cost to
the airline to do business.
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John Nance (Panel Moderator)
I'd agree with that.
Ray Hutchinson
And that's why it is absolutely true that our airports were not
generally, at least historically, designed with security in mind.
Just a very short vignette, if you'll remember the peculiar ar-
rangements of the terminals at D/FW, that airport was designed
in a regulated environment. It was talked about earlier. And
what that meant was that the federal government was going to
tell you to go to Texarkana, then go over to Tyler, and then
come to somewhere else, and then land at D/FW. That's the
regulated environment.
The design was that that spine road at D/FW would have four-
teen half-loops by the year 2001, this year. This was the target
year. Then, deregulation came along in 1978 and 1979. All of
that changed. So, now you don't have that land used for termi-
nals. You have - when you went to the hub-and-spoke system,
that's where you have a dominant carrier or two at an airport.
Then, they create the hub. Then, they go out with the smaller
airplanes to Tyler and Longview or wherever to bring in the
feeder system. That's where the terminal areas became obsolete
at D/FW.
By and large, the recent credit reports after the immediate
concern by Moody's, the recent credit reports are suggesting
that there is some movement in the airline's creditworthiness.
As a matter of fact, these numbers demonstrate some increased
activity from September to November. November's a little bit
better than September was. If that continues, then there should
be no material problem. There could be an expected cutback
in some of the projected infrastructure at airports.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
You say that we've lost a number of airlines. I can personally
attest to that. I was with Braniff International in 1982. We went
bankrupt on May 12th of 1982 at 4:34 in the afternoon, not that
I remember it well.
Ray Hutchinson
Jim, as a matter of fact, one of the interesting vignettes of
Braniff, because it was not American initially that was the big
player in the Dallas-Fort Worth market. It was Braniff. And
2002]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE
when deregulation came along, the leadership of Braniff said,
"It will never work." And so what we need to do is to expand our
routes all over the world because when Congress comes back in,
it will leave the carriers in place where they find them. They will
re-regulate them there. That didn't happen. Braniff is no
longer with us.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
We asked for 786 routes on one day in front of the CAB, as a
matter of fact. That was right. And by the way, for any of you
who may not know, I wrote the book on this. I can tell you.
There's still that rumor out there among old Braniff employees
that American killed Braniff or something else, that interest
rates killed Braniff. Nothing could be further from the truth.
We killed ourselves. We couldn't communicate. This is a differ-
ent story for a different day.
Ray Hutchinson
You see, Chili's is configured inside the security area, so what
do you do about the knife? You know, that's inside the zone. So
yes, there'll have to be some re-design. You've got to flip it. No
question about it.
lames Hall
When I was on the White House Commission, I decided to
take two airports. I was familiar with Memphis. I found an air-
port comparable in size in Amsterdam. The entire philosophy
of course in the Netherlands is for gate security. You have
screening devices at the gates. Obviously, that required you to
have additional equipment at each gate. But everything behind
that gate was then a secure area.
Our philosophy here, which was to save money, so there was
just one device for the whole concourse, has now resulted in,
and I agree very much. They need the retail income. But we
now have all the minimum-wage employees, so to speak, and
others, we have a tremendous - all within the secure area of
the airport. We need to redesign.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
As a matter of fact, when Braniff had their first terminal. I
don't know if American did it or not. But we had the security at
the gate. That's part of the design of this terminal. You'd come
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right through from the curbside, go right to your gate. And you
went through security there.
Ray Hutchinson
And you don't have to have - you know, give your license
and ticket here, there, and everywhere. You can do it in one
place, one time.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
That's true. Back to the question.
Ray Hutchinson
There were two entities. After Pan Am 103, President Bush
put a special presidential commission in place. It studied the
subject of security. We saw the result in the British system that
most of the changes were made as a result of Pan Am 103. If
you remember, it was a piece of luggage that blew up Pan Am
103. That is why the British were very big on positive bag match
and putting in place screening for the luggage.
After TWA 800, which many people initially thought was a ter-
rorist act - it happened very close to the Olympics, and a long
story there - President Clinton had a White House Commis-
sion on Aviation, Safety and Security, which was known as the
Gore Commission. But now since last November, we don't refer
to it as the Gore Commission anymore. We refer to it as the
White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.
It looked at security issues. Out of TWA-800, we had millions
of dollars that were given to the FBI and the CIA for additional
work and terrorist activity. And a number of recommendations
were made to the Department of Transportation, and specifi-
cally to the FAA, on what should be done on aviation security.
Some of those were in the process of being implemented. The
progress was very slow on the recommendations. The recom-




I'd like to see the President take somebody that's a strong-
minded, well-respected person like Mr. Casey or Mr. Crandall or
somebody that he has confidence in and give them the responsi-
bility and say, whether it's Governor Ridge, or this individual's
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going to be responsible and accountable for pulling this
together.
Q: Who gets trigger-pulling authority? How do they get it?
John Attanasio
To do something like that, the President would have trigger-
pulling authority. You look at the office of Governor Ridge.
Something could be done. I think whatJim might have in mind
is something along those lines. Something could be done along
those lines and put it in the office of the White House.
James Hall
I hope that I'm proven wrong, but I don't think we can ad-
dress this through the multi-layered structures and bureaucra-
cies we have in place. I think we've got to short-circuit it. We've
got to put somebody in charge. We've got to address it immedi-
ately. I think if we do that, then the American people will - we
can start beginning to rebuild confidence. I think the President
made a very wise decision in putting the National Guard in the
airports. That's a very visible presence for everyone here of se-
curity. But people very soon are very knowledgeable now.
They're going to ask the issuer, 'That's wonderful. But what
about the bags?" So, we've got to have somebody that's looking
at the whole system, somebody that has the confidence of the
President to take charge.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Well, this is the eternal difference that we always have to keep
in mind between a calcified, bureaucratic methodology, which
bureaucracy is part of our strength and part of our weakness.
It's our weakness when we need to move fast. It's our strength
when we don't want to change things catastrophically without
having time to figure out whether we're right or wrong about it.
Q: [Inaudible]
James Hall
I was responsible for aviation safety in terms of oversight and
the work of the NTSB. We would have literally several times a
week a safety incident that could get attention or publicity. A
plane would have to land because of smoke in the cockpit or
something would happen. But generally, people have confi-
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dence in the system because the system has produced. It will
take time to turn that around. But it can be done.
Ray Hutchinson
I think that's a very good question. How can you expect the
people to be confident if you're telling them every other day
you're fixing to get rained on? That's a pretty tough challenge.
I happen to believe that you are going to change - you are
facing a new day. There will be a necessity to alert the American
people. I do believe that the American people are mature
enough to take it at its value, be alert, go on about your busi-
ness, but be alert.
We're in a new day in a new era. I've not engaged in this
federal versus private debate on purpose because I may differ in
opinion with some of my good friends. We're the only nation
under attack. Speaking solely for myself, I can accept the pro-
position that my government is telling me, "Look, be careful,
Ray, when you go downtown today." I think that's fine. I don't
like it. I'd rather them do that than not, and I go downtown.
John Attanasio
I don't mean to be glib about this. Given a choice, I've been
on an airplane a lot of times as has the whole panel since this
happened. Given a choice between going on a plane and going
on 1-635, there's no doubt that the statistics that the good econ-
omist gave us, there's just no doubt. There's just no question,
which one is safer even today. And part of it is that I, like many
of you, we've all seen the Trade Towers collapse.
I still have great difficulty even conceptualizing that. That act,
I think, strikes fear in all of us. But I think that when one looks
at the hard numbers, there's just no questioning in terms of the
level of safety between all the other things that we do. I think
Crandall yesterday talked about taking a shower. I couldn't fig-
ure that one out. So, I was scared to take my shower this morn-
ing. But in terms of certainly going on 1-635, there's just no
comparison level of safety.
Q: [Unintelligible]. But I just wonder how you reconcile
the position that we're safe to go out there, but no, we're not
safe.
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Ray Hutchinson
Well, I think we've got to give that message. I think you need
to have somebody that's that responsible over the short period
of time here, the next year or two, that can be talking on that
subject and reassuring people. The problem we have in aviation
is that God didn't give us wings. Therefore, there are a lot of
people thatjust have a basic fear of flying. So, you've got that in
addition to what occurred. It's a little harder than trying to get
people back in their automobiles.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Flying is not a natural act. Let me address this too. There's
one point. I don't think it's excessive flag-waving. I think it is a
very important point. You all shoot at it if you want to, anybody
in here. Look, we are under attack by an enemy who is inchoate,
difficult to find, difficult to identify, difficult to target. But we
know what that enemy wants. They want to disrupt our lifestyle.
They want to bring our economy to its knees. They want to get
us so full of fear that we will help with that self-destruction.
I've been saying, and I've said this on the air a number of
times lately, any time you cancel a flight, a trip, anything else
that you are planning to do that you need to do, look yourself in
the mirror and say, "Do I really want to send a love letter to
Osama bin Laden?" Essentially we're helping our enemies when
we do that. Now, that doesn't mean that we should just be blind
to any risk. Obviously, when the word comes out from the Attor-
ney General that we need to be careful, just as you're saying, we
need to be careful when we go downtown. We need to be alert.
We need to have 280 million of us, to the extent possible, being
part of the solution of looking for things.
After all, those people of September 11th didn't move silently
through our society. They clunked through our society and left
a lot in their wake that nobody saw and nobody reported.
Things are different now. But what I'm saying is this is a matter
of patriotism too. This is part of the cost of being in a society
like ours. When we get attacked, we have to look at ourselves in
the mirror and say, "What is it that's our responsibility here?"
Part of it is to understand as much as we can. Part of it is to say,
"Not damn the torpedoes full speed ahead," but, "I am going to
take reasonable risks."
And certainly, if I know that my cowering under my desk
rather than going out and flying is going to help destroy an in-
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dustry that's going to come back on me later, then I've got a
responsibility as a citizen to get out there and fly. It seems a
little strange on some points to say. It's almost like saying, 'Just
go write a check to American," and you can stay home. But the
point is that we really do need to keep our system operating as
much as we can. I really do think that is a matter of responsibil-
ity as citizens.
Ray Hutchinson
Well, I think Dr. Cox said it best. The biggest deterrent that
happened and didn't get a ton of attention was the philosophy
we had on dealing with hijackers, which was to cooperate with
them.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Yeah.
Ray Hutchinson
Now that's changed. Nobody is going to get up, go down, and
take over an aircraft again without - in this country - without
having the citizens attack as those brave people did in
Pittsburgh.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Exactly.
Ray Hutchinson
That makes that whole system - the system is tremendously
safer just because of that change, in philosophy regardless of
what we do with the other areas which are important.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Let me just direct it back out again. Then we'll come back
out here. Let's direct it back again to kind of beginning to sum-
marize some of the things that we're talking about here. We're
dealing with the question, first of all, of is there a survivability
question of the airlines? If airlines are hemorrhaging $400 mil-
lion in a quarter, there's a survivability question.
What should we do about it? Should we keep everybody
propped up? Should we prop up only a few? How do we make
the decision? What's the role of government? And certainly an-
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other question I think that we've gotten on the table here which
is very important, isn't the police power of the federal govern-
ment right on the griddle here in terms of being able to accept,
take, and properly execute the responsibility for the security as-
pect that was breached so horribly by our unpreparedness as a
system, our unpreparedness on September 11th?
Q: Given that a lot of the discussion has been government
service, we don't take money, but we're vital to the economy?
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
First of all, I want everybody in on this. But I would argue that
there is no question. There has never been any question. There
was on Capitol Hill in 1978. Is it a public utility? No. It's not a
public utility. It's a private business. Baloney. It is very vital to
the American society. Therefore, we have to expand the defini-
tion of public utility. That's me speaking. But I think I've been
borne out over the last twenty years. But that doesn't mean that
you immediately lock it down in the type of governmental regu-
lations that were strangling the industry by 1978 and that led to
the overreaction, overreaction, my point of view, that ended up
with the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
Let's address that. Does this in any way, gentlemen, mean
that we've got to go back and consider some form of regulation?
Is there anything to be accomplished?
Dr. Albert Casey
No, no, no.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
No?
Dr. Albert Casey
You don't want to go back and consider regulation. No ques-
tion about it. We've paid the price of moving into deregulation.
We've got a good deregulated industry here. It's working very
well. We don't have the trouble of monopolistic problems. We
don't have the trouble of users prices. I don't see anything
wrong with the airline industry as it has evolved. It's been very
hard in the small communities. It's been very good in the big
communities. That's just the price of industry. I would hope
we'd just stay with it. I don't think there's any real move to go
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back to deregulation. I don't see how that helps the terrorist
thing anyway.
Q: Not a backwards move. I was curious with how you
thought the [unintelligible] would proceed?
Dr. Albert Casey
It's coming along just fine.
Q: What's the business model for American Airlines? [Inau-
dible] lots of money. When you talk about how much money's
been lost, if it's not going to go back to deregulation, what form
can it take that would be successful?
Dr. Albert Casey
Well, we've been trying since the days of Kitty Hawk to find
out how to make money. It's a very difficult business. I go back
to the earlier remarks. We're capital-intensive. We're labor-in-
tensive. We're cyclical. It's a very, very poor business to be in.
Q: Well, Southwest Airlines has made money every year
since -
Dr. Albert Casey
I know, but Southwest Airlines gives you peanuts. You go to
San Francisco.
Q: We're getting ready to prop up these industries whether
they're failing or not because they're so important. Isn't the
[unintelligible] that we asked which ones are worthy? You
brought this up earlier. Maybe is there something flawed funda-
mentally about this hub-and-spoke system that gets -
Dr. Albert Casey
I don't think it's the hub-and-spoke system. I think it's the
way that we operate as such. In other words, our food is terribly
expensive. If we get rid of the food service, we can turn air-
planes around in half the time that it takes us today to turn an
airplane around. I think we're going to have to do things differ-
ently. Food's going to go by the pass. I don't believe food will
ever come back really to the degree that it was.
Q: And how do you see this continuing?
Dr. Albert Casey
Absolutely, because if the gathering [unintelligible].
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John Nance (Panel Moderator)
We're just about out of time. We want to give everybody a
round, a final crack at this. Let me just say again. With great
respect to Herb Kelleher and everybody at Southwest, they're
not an airline. Let me let that sit there for a second. They're
not an airline in the traditional sense. They are a special form
of transportation brilliantly conceived, marvelously executed,
and greatly profitable. But they are not an airline in the tradi-
tional sense. I'll stand by that. I've been arguing this for twenty
years.
Let me give everybody a round here in terms of a last shot at
this in any aspect that you'd like to. Ray?
Ray Hutchinson
Well, I think we may not have made a lot of progress in terms
of advancing what they need to do. I do think there are many
other things that they need to look at. I will throw on the table
and leave this God-awful question of making sure that if a visa
that's issued in another country is for a person to come to this
country to go to Southern Methodist University, that we make
sure that that's what he's doing when he's here.
I'm afraid that that system has failed. That's got to change. I
think the President was right on the mark yesterday when he
addressed it. There are many, many things that need to be
done. I personally believe that there is some level of confidence
that's stabilizing. We will be going, I suspect, to the market in
airports around the nation here pretty quickly. You're going to
see that'll be the measure.
It doesn't matter what we say or what Congress says or what
anybody else says or what American Airlines says. What is that
investor going to do at that airport? Is he willing to buy or not?
And I suspect you're going to get a pretty serious, quick test of
that in the marketplace within the next couple of months.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Thank you. Jim?
James Hall
Well, let me just first say it's a pleasure to be here. It's always
nice to be in Texas and see how well our new territory is doing.
But you know, I think I've got to get back to the title. If I re-
member the title, we're talking about aviation security and fear
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or freedom. And you know, can we address the problem? Do I
think the structure of aviation is going to change dramatically in
the future? No. It's going to be basically the same.
What we need to do is it's the old capitalistic, "You get what
you pay for." We did not pay for a good security system. We
now have realized that we have paid a horrendous price for us
collectively as a society. It's a collective failure not addressing
this issue. It now needs to be addressed. Congress needs to
move expeditiously to put a structure in place that can unleash
the creativity and rebuild the confidence of the American peo-
ple. It's certainly something that we can all address.
Of course, Winston Churchill's everybody's hero. He hap-
pens to be one of mine even though he was not a Tennessean.
But you know, the only thing you have to fear in this situation is
fear itself. We can address these problems. We just need to be
about doing it.
I'm very pleased to see the law students, the people that -
they're going to live a much longer time under the situation
that we're going to have to address with our society, being in-
volved and participating and expressing your opinion. That's
what makes this country unique. I hope everybody would be
sure they express themselves to their elected representatives,
and we can move forward.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
By the way, before we get started, I'm a little constrained in
engaging in a Texas versus Tennessee tug-of-war here, because
in about 1840, the Nance family came from Tennessee.
Al.
Dr. Albert Casey
I'm very pleased to be here. I enjoyed it too. I still think the
real thing is we've got to react to this terrible cash train right
now. We've got to supply with the money that they need to stay
in the air. On what selective basis, I'm not sure yet. I think the
real thing we need is a little passage of time. We're going to get
more and more confidence as this happens. I can recall saying,
"Gee, I wish I" - I had five hijackings when I was at American.
I'd love to go back to the quiet days of the hijackings instead of
the terrorists. They were much easier to handle. We never lost
a soul. We never even lost a hijacker.
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I'm pleased to participate. We're all indebted to Dean At-
tanasio for putting this thing through. Our priority has to be
security and survivability of a way of life that's important to all of
us. Thank you all for participating.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Dean?
John Attanasio
Yeah. I just think that what happened on September 11 th was
a systematic attack on our way of life in many, many different
respects. And because of anthrax and a number of those cur-
rent attacks, whoever is carrying them out, the systematic nature
and the military nature of the attacks has been sort of over-
looked. I think this is one of the most untold stories until the
losses of American and United came out last week. This is one
of the way in which our society can be attacked in a very real and
vital way.
I think that John spoke earlier about the economy being
tightly wound. There's no question about that. We did a con-
ference here two years ago about the global financial crisis,
which suggested just that. Consequently, like anything that's
tightly wound, we were in an extremely vulnerable position. We
got hit hard. Now, what we have to do is to make sure that we're
not hit too hard and that we don't inflict damage on ourselves.
So, hopefully this has been - for me, it certainly has been an
enlightening panel where I've learned a lot.
I want to thank everyone for coming here, and the organizers
in particular. This will be the first of three discussions on this.
Thanks.
John Nance (Panel Moderator)
Chairman Casey, Chairman Hall, Ray Hutchinson, Dean John
Attanasio, and everybody here, thank you very much for partici-
pation. I do want to leave you with one thought. The strength
of Americans as a people comes from two forms, two things.
Number one, is our diversity, because we are made up of all the
peoples of the world and all the good ideas of the world. We've
become in effect the world's country. I think that's very, very
true. Just like New York was America's city that was one of the
reasons that it hit us so hard to see those towers go down.
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There's another thing. We have an infinite capacity for dis-
cussion and the ability to find alternative methodologies and to
pick ways to go. We are unfettered in our society in being able
to do that with open discussion, which is what, of course, this is
all about. In this great law school, which I'm so proud of, this is
a great place to have this not just start, but to continue. And it's
incumbent on all of us to continue this debate, to bring it to
points of fruition whenever possible, and to communicate your
ideas without any fettering of those ideas to your elected
representatives.
Thank you very much.
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